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DELIVERY OF DEEDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
It is well settled in South Carolina,1 as in other jurisdictions, 2
that a deed must be delivered to be effective. In early common
law, a deed was defined as, "a writing sealed and delivered by
the parties."3 While the South Carolina courts have recognized
the requirement of delivery, there has been a great deal of litiga-
tion as to what constituted sufficient delivery. The purpose of
this note is to consider the facts and circumstances which the
South Carolina courts have stated as constituting sufficient de-
livery.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the confusion that has arisen in connection with
delivery comes from the fact that the term implies a manual
transfer from one person to another. Thus, the term "delivery"
has come to be used in two senses: first, to indicate the formal
act by which a deed transfers control from the grantor to the
grantee, and secondly, to describe the manual transfer of the
deed. This confusion of "delivery" with manual transfer can
be traced back to early English law, where delivery of a deed
was closely akin to livery of seisin.
The expression "delivery," as applied to a written instru-
ment, has its inception, it appears, in connection with writ-
ten conveyances of lands, the manual transfer or delivery
of which was, in early times, upon parts of the continent
of Europe, regarded as in effect a symbolic transfer of
land itself, analogous to livery of seisin .... The view that
a transfer of land could be effected by means of the man-
ual transfer of a writing was originally adopted in England
to but a limited extent, but in so far as the courts recog-
nized the effectiveness of a written instrument for the
purpose of transfer or of contract, they adopted the con-
1. For a conveyance by deed to be operative in transfering title to land,
the deed must be signed, sealed, and delivered. Johnson v. Johnson, 44 S.C.
364, 369, 22 S.E. 419, 422 (1895).
2. For cases in other jurisdictions see 23 Ame. Ju . 2d Deeds § 79 n.20
(1965).
3. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 295 (10th ed. 1787).
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tinental conception of a physical change of possession thereof
as a prerequisite to its legal operation .... 4
Gradually, however, the law became less formal and the crude
concept of manual delivery of the instrument as the only means
of mating it legally operative has given way to the more modern
view that delivery is merely a question of intention supplemented
by some manifestation of that intention.5
II. INTENTION
While delivery is necessary for a deed to be legally operative,
it is clear that a manual transfer from the possession of the
grantor to the possession of the grantee is not necessary. 6 Rather,
it is the intention of the parties that is the essential and control-
ling element of delivery. That intention is the "essence" of
delivery was recognized by the South Carolina Supreme Court
in Powers v. RawZs, when it stated the requirements for delivery:
"Delivery of a deed includes, not only an act by which the
grantor evinces a purpose to part with the control of the instru-
ment, but a concurring intent thereby to vest the title in the
grantee."17 It appears from this and earlier decisions that de-
livery in the legal sense is composed of two parts: namely, (1)
an intention to deliver and (2) an act evincing a purpose to
part with the control of the instrument, neither of which alone
is sufficient to constitute delivery.8 However, the courts have
not attempted to distinguish the physical acts from the necessary
intent. Thus when there is any question as to whether the acts
of the grantor were sufficient to constitute delivery, the courts
4. 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1033 (3d ed. 1939); Wigmore reports:
"at the same time there had already begun an effort to refine the technicality,
and to deny effectiveness to a manual transfer even to the grantee himself, if
it purported to be, not a true delivery . . . . But the authority and vogue
of Coke's and Sheppard's writings obscured and suppressed prematurely the
progressive conception; and it has been reserved for very modem times to re-
pudiate this last relic of primative formalism." 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2405
(3d ed. 1940).
5. 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1034 (3d ed. 1939).
6. "It is undoubtedly true, that it is not essential to the complete execution
of a deed, that there should be a manual delivery." Moss v. Smith, 73 S.C.
231, 234, 53 S.E. 284, 285 (1906).
7. 119 S.C. 134, 153-54, 112 S.E. 78, 85 (1922).
8. Carrigan v. Byrd, 23 S.C. 89 (1885).
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have used the grantors intent to supply this deficiency, and
conversely, if there is a question of intent this may be provided
by the physical acts of delivery.' 0
As to the first requirement, that the grantor must have an
intent to deliver, i.e., that the grantor intended to give the in-
strument legal effect, the intention of the parties at the time of
the transaction is controlling." There can be delivery even
though the grantee might not know the terms of the convey-
ance,12 or that the conveyance was made at all.'3  Moreover,
delivery may be made to a third person for the benefit of the
grantee. 14 Tiffany states the effectiveness of the delivery seems
to result not from any particular virtue in the transfer, but
from the fact that the transfer shows an intention to make the
instrument legally effective.' 5 But it is also clear that if the
delivery made to the third person was done without intent that
it should become effective, it will not be effective.1 Further-
9. See Fraser v. Davie, 11 S.C. 56 (1878). In this case the grantor exe-
cuted a deed in trust for the grantee, but with the understanding that it was
to be held by the trustee and not recorded until the rest of the agreement was
fulfilled. The court held that it was clear that the grantor by withholding
the deed from record rendered it inoperative, and "as delivery is an act of
mind as well as a manual act, presupposing consent that the deed should be-
come operative, evidence showing the absence of consent must have weight
against the inferences arising from mere manual delivery." Id. at 67.
10. "The ordinary and usual mode of completing the execution of a deed
is by manual delivery, and when the grantor seals and signs the deed, and
then makes a manual delivery of it to the grantee, it unquestionably furnishes
strong evidence that he intended to convey the title. It is the nature of a pre-
sumption based upon the doctrine that a person must be regarded as intending
the reasonable and natural consequences of his act." Moss v. Smith, 73 S.C.
231, 234, 53 S.E. 284, 285 (1906).
11. "Under all the authorities 'delivery', as applied to a deed, means not so
much a manual act but the intention of the maker . . . the intent referred to
is, of course, that existing at the time of the transaction not subsequently and
not subject to later change of mind." Little v. Little, 215 S.C. 52, 60, 53
S.E.2d 884, 888 (1949).
12. Branton v. Martin, 243 S.C. 90, 132 S.E2d 285 (1963).
13. See, Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S.C. 451, 77 S.E. 129 (1913). In Withers v.
Jenkins, 6 S.C. 122, 124 (1875), the court stated: "If the grantor, in the ab-
sence of the grantee, and without his knowledge, has actually consummated the
delivery in accord with the purpose declared on the face of the instrument,
the object to be effected by it is as fully accomplished as if there had been an
actual transfer of the paper from the hands of the grantor to those of the
grantee." Cf. Branton v. Martin, 243 S.C. 90, 132 S.E.2d 285 (1963).
14. Brooks v. Bobo, 4 Strob. L. 38 (S.C. 1849). In Withers v. Jenkins, 6
S.C. 122 (1875) the court stated that "[d]elivery to a stranger for the use and
on behalf of the grantee, fulfills all the purposes which the grantor proposes
by the act. If the deed is valid in other respects, when he has actually passed
it from control and directed it to be recorded, all his power over it is gone, and
it at once becomes subject to that of the grantee." Id. at 124.
15. 4 H. TIFAN Y, REAL PROPERTY § 1034 (3d ed. 1939).
16. See Arthur v. Anderson, 9 S.C. 234 (1878) ; cf. Patterson v. Causey, 119
S.C. 12, 111 S.E. 725 (1922) (dissenting opinion).
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more, delivery to the grantee himself is insufficient if not with
intent to convey, but rather for the purpose of having other
signatures attached,17 or to enable the grantee to examine the
instrument. 8 Since a voluntary transfer of the instrument by
the grantor to the grantee does not effect delivery, if made with
no intent that the instrument shall be legally operative, the
fact that the grantee has acquired possession without the grant-
or's consent does not make it effective, because it may have been
obtained by fraud, theft or discovery. 19 If the acquisition is
not authorized by the grantor, it cannot be supported by the
intent to make a conveyance.20 However, there are a number
of cases in several jurisdictions21 to the effect that the grantor
will be estopped to deny delivery if because of his lack of care
in the custody of the instrument, the grantee obtains possession
of the instrument and places it in the hands of a bona fide pur-
chaser.22 The grantor must also have intended by the act of
delivery that the deed should become presently operative as
such and thus pass present title. Therefore, it is evident that
if the grantor intended that the property should become presently
vested in the grantee, he must have intended to deliver the deed,
and conversely, he could not have intended delivery if he did not
intend to transfer present title.
2 8
The second requirement for delivery is that there must be an
act evidencing a purpose to part with control of the instrument.
As stated, manual transfer of the instrument is not necessary;
however, there must be some act on the part of the grantor to
17. Arthur v. Anderson, 9 S.C. 234 (1878).
18. Cf. Little v. Little, 215 S.C. 52, 53 S.E.2d 884 (1949). In this case the
grantor, who was the mother of the grantee, testified that the deed was not
kept in hiding or locked away from him and admitted that she allowed him
to read it for his information. However, other circumstances in the case tend-
ed to show that there had been delivery and the court so held.
19. Shaw v. Cunningham, 16 S.C. 631 (1881); cf. Merck v. Merck, 83 S.C.
329, 65 S.E. 347 (1909).
20. See Robertson v. Evans, 3 S.C. 330 (1872).
21. See 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1035 (3d ed. 1939).
22. In Merck v. Merck, 83 S.C. 329, 65 S.E. 347 (1909), the court reasoned
that when one executes a deed complete on its fact and lacking only delivery
to make it complete and negligently leaves it where the grantee could, and
does in fact, take it, and has it recorded, the grantor is estopped from denying
its delivery.
23. In Burke v. Burke, 141 S.C. 1, 139 S.E. 209 (1927), the court held that
for the conveyance to have become complete, it would have been necessary
that the grantor should have retained no further interest in the land except
the life estate. Here, the retaining of the right to mortgage the property
amounted to a continuing public assertion of ownership and control that
would be wholly incompatible with the delivery of a deed under which only
a life interest had been retained by the grantor.
[Vol. 20
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render it effective as a conveyance.24 The courts in referring
to delivery often speak as if transfer were essential to delivery.
However, as Tiffany notes, delivery in essence, involves no
delivery "to" any one, since it means merely the expression, by
word or act of an intention that the instrument shall be legally
operative. The fact that in many cases such intention is indicated
by the making of a physical transfer does not show that such
transfer is necessary.25 Nevertheless, it is the rule in most
jurisdictions, 26 that the grantor must show, by word or act,
an intention to put the instrument beyond his legal control,
although not necessarily his physical control.
This brings up an interesting question as to whether there
can be a delivery without the grantor ever parting with pos-
session of the instrument. South Carolina courts have spoken
as if physical transfer of the deed was necessary.2 7 However,
in two early cases the court intimated that there can be a delivery
without the grantor giving up possession or doing any act pre-
sumptive of an intent to deliver, except the mere execution of
the deed.28 In Wood v. Ingraham,29 dicta in the court's opinion
gives support to the English and New York rule that when a
deed is signed and sealed, and declared by the grantor to be
delivered in the presence of witnesses, this is an effective de-
livery.30 The court in Harris v. Saunders' affirmed the lower
court's statement
that there was no prescribed formula for the delivery of
the deed; that if it appeared from all the facts and circum-
stances, that the gift or contract was complete, without any
conditions or qualifications annexed, and without anything
remaining to be done, it was a valid delivery, and a perfect
deed, although left in the hands of the donor.
3 2
Among the facts that the court felt should be considered by
the jury was whether the donor had subsequently regarded the
24. Williams v. Lawrence, 194 S.C. 1, 10, 8 S.E2d 838, 842 (1940):
"Delivery rests not in words written, but in things done and said."
25. 4 H. TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1035 (3d ed. 1939).
26. See generally 23 Am. JuR. 2d 20, Deeds § 89 (1965).
27. See, e.g., Jackson v. Inabnit, 2 Hill Eq. 411 (S.C. 1836).
28. For discussion of the presumptive evidence that arises in some juris-
dictions from the executions of the deed see Part B of Presumptions infra.
29. 3 Strob. Eq. 105 (S.C. 1849).
30. See also note 45, infra.
31. 2 Strob. Eq. 370 (S.C. 1835).
32. Id. at 372-73.
NoTs1968]
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title transferred to the plaintiff and whether he had exhibited
the deed, and spoken of it as a perfected instrument.
However, the traditional approach as stated by the courts, and
other authorities, 3 is that the grantor must put the deed out of
his possession. Although the Wood and Harris cases pronounce
perhaps a more realistic view of delivery, the courts still empha-
size the lack of physical changing of possession often in spite
of strong evidence of the intention of the grantor that the deed
should be effective. In Rountree v. Rountree3 4 the grantor
dictated a deed to his physician which proposed to give his
nephew an interest in a tract of land. After his death a few
days later, the deed was delivered to the grantor's executor. The
grantee was a minor at the time, but his guardian had been
present at the execution of the deed and testified that the grantor
had declared to him that he wanted his nephew to have the land.
The court, relying on the earlier case of Merck v. Merck,35 held
that there was no delivery, finding that the instrument was left
at the home of the maker with no intent that it be delivered dur-
ing his lifetime. Thus, in South Carolina the courts still seem
to require that there be a parting of possession, in the absence
of other acts, such as recording, etc., for there to be an effective
delivery.
III. PRasumi'io~s
A. Retention of Possession by the Grantor
It is generally stated that the retention of possession and con-
trol over the deed by the grantor raises the presumption of non-
delivery, especially when it is in his possession at the time of
death.:" In Wood '. Ingralham,3 7 the grantor, desiring to change
her will, had certain deeds prepared to carry her intentions into
effect. She later signed the deeds and had them witnessed. The
33. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTACTS § 102, comment b. at
217 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) states: "Otherwise, however, tradition requires
that the promisor put the document out of his possession. But the change of
possession need not be permanent; a delivery for the purpose of public re-
cording, for example, may suffice even though the document is then redeliver-
ed to the promisor."
34. 85 S.C. 383, 67 S.E. 471 (1910).
35. 83 S.C. 329, 65 S.E. 347 (1909). In this case the court stated: "It is
essential to delivery that the deed should pass beyond the control of the
grantor. If the grantor retains the custody and control during his life, the
pape- cannot have effect as a deed at his death. Id. at 341, 65 S.E. at 351.
36. Id.
37. 3 Strob. Eq. 105 (S.C. 1839).
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deeds were then placed in a drawer and retained by the grantor
so that she could think about it for a while before she delivered
them. She later decided to destroy the deeds. On the question
of whether the deeds had been delivered, the court held that the
delivery could not be presumed when the grantor retained the
entire possession and control of the deed, and made no publica-
tion of its contents, nor declaration of her intention to deliver it.
Other evidence may be shown to rebut the presumption of
non-delivery arising from the grantor's retention of possession at
his death.38 That a deed of voluntary conveyance was placed
on record is a strong indication that it was delivered, despite
the fact that it was found among the grantor's effects after his
death.30 Furthermore, the fact that the grantor has retained
possession after it has been recorded will not rebut the presump-
tion of delivery especially when the grantees are minors and
members of the grantor's family.40
B. Possession by the Grantee
A presumption of delivery has been said to arise when the
grantee has possession of the instrument.4' This presumption is
usually said to arise on the probability that the grantor gave
him possession, and the improbability that the grantor would
vest him with the deed unless he intended that title should pass.
42
The presumption of delivery, however, is rebuttable, as when it
38. Dawson v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S.C. 1849).
39. Id. (syllabus). When the grantor retains possession of the deed but
delivers it "to a justice to take proof of its execution and afterwards to the
proper offices for the recording of deeds, where it is recorded, this will be
sufficient evidence of the delivery, to pass the interests conveyed to the
grantees, though the grantor became repossessed of the original deed, and it
is found among his papers after his death."
40. Folk v. Varn, 9 Rich. Eq. 303 (S.C. 1857). In this case the court
stated,
I am satisfied by the evidence, that the deed was delivered. Not that
it was put into the hands of the child who was the donee, for that would
have been a farcial formality, but that it was delivered to the witness
for probate, and to the register for recording . . . and was afterwards
retaken from the register by the donor, as the natural guardian of the
child, and kept among his papers.
Id. at 306.
41. Williams v. Sullivan, 10 Rich. Eq. 217 (S.C. 1858). In Wheeler v. Du-
rant, 3 Rich. Eq. 452, 459 (S.C. 1851), the court stated: "Considering the in-
strument a deed, I conclude that there was sufficient evidence of delivery.
From the possession of the instrument by the person to whom the delivery
should be made, and the custody committed, delivery should be presumed, in
the absence of any countervailing evidence."
42. 4 H. TiFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 1040 (3d ed. 1939). See also note 10
,rupra.
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can be shown that the grantee had the instrument in his hands
for another purpose48-the burden of proof being on the party
disputing the delivery.
0. Signing and Sealing in Presence of Witnesses
In some jurisdictions, there have been decisions to the effect
that the signing and sealing of an instrument in the presence
of an attesting witness raises a presumption of delivery. These
decisions were based largely on the practice in those jurisdictions
of making delivery of the instrument by a declaration to that
effect in the presence of witnesses at the time of signing and
sealing.44 While this presumption has never been expressly re-
jected in South Carolina,45 and in some cases there has been
dicta recognizing this presumption,46 it is doubtful that such a
presumption could be justified, especially if the grantee were
not present.4 7
D. Reoital of Delivery in Attestation Clause
In a few jurisdictions, the fact that the attestation clause re-
cites the delivery creates the presumption of delivery.48 The
courts in South Carolina have never recognized such a presump-
tion, although some early cases state that this is evidence that
there was delivery.
40
E. Acknowledgement by the Grantor
Acknowledgement by the grantor of his execution of the deed
has been recognized by many courts as creating a presumption of
43. See, e.g., Little v. Little, 215 S.C. 52, 53 S.E.2d 884 (1949); Arthur v.
Anderson, 9 S.C. 234 (1878).
44. 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PaoPT-y § 1041 (3d ed. 1939).
45. In Wood v. Ingraham, 3 Strob. Eq. 105, 110 (S.C. 1849), the court
stated, "jItihere is nothing in this case that is opposed to the rule that has been
settled in New York since 1814, and in England, since 1826, that if a deed be
signed and sealed, and declared by the grantor in the presence of attesting
witnesses, to be delivered as his deed, it is an effectual delivery ....
But see, Arthur v. Anderson, 9 S.C. 234 (1878).
46. Guess v. South Bound Ry., 40 S.C. 450, 455, 19 S.E. 68, 70 (1894):
[T]he plaintiff's own testimony is quite sufficient to show that the deed was
actually delivered, for he says that the deed was executed (which, of course,
implies delivery) in the presence of two subscribing witnesses . . .
47. 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL NOPERTY § 1041 (3d ed. 1939); cf. Jackson v.
Inabnit, 2 Hill Eq. 411 (S.C. 1836).
48. 4 H. TFANY, REAL PnoPERTY § 1042 (3d ed. 1939).
49. Folk v. Varn, 9 Rich. Eq. 303 (S.C. 1857); Dawson v. Dawson, Rice.
Eq. 243 (S.C. 1839).
[Vol. 20
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delivery.50 In South Carolina, the rule appears to be that such
an acknowledgement is evidence bearing on the question of
delivery.51 Many of the authorities are in accord with the South
Carolina view and believe that the courts should refrain from
the assertion of a presumption of delivery from acknowledgment
-leaving it to the jury to determine whether the circumstances
of a particular case show an intention by the grantor that the
deed should become legally operative.
52
F. Recording
It is generally recognized by all the authorities on the subject
that the recording of the instrument by the grantor, or leaving
it with the proper official for record, raises a presumption of
delivery-the rationale being that the grantor could only have
intended by his leaving the instrument for record that it should
become legally operative.5 3 That this is the rule in South Caro-
lina is beyond doubt.54 It is also well recognized that this
presumption is rebuttable by evidence that the grantor did not
intend that the instrument was to operate as a conveyance. 5
Evidence that it was placed on record without authority,"0 or
50. 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1043 (3d ed. 1939); See also 23 Am.
JurL 2d, Deeds § 119 (1965). Usually a presumption of delivery of a deed
that has been acknowledged arises only when there is no evidence on the point
or when the proof is balanced. In some jurisdictions, the mere fact of acknowl-
edgement, standing alone, does not make a prima facie showing of delivery.
51. Broughton v. Telfer, 3 Rich. Eq. 431 (S.C. 1851). In this case, one
William Remley executed a deed by which he conveyed certain slaves in trust.
On the same day, Remley executed his will, in which he referred to and
recognized the deed. The lower court stated: "Remley himself, in his will,
speaks of the deed as a valid subsisting and effectual deed, by which he ac-
knowledges himself to have disposed of the slaves mentioned in it. These are
the facts mentioned as bearing on the question of delivery. I think they are
sufficient to establish the due delivery of the deed." Id. at 435. See also,
Dawson v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S.C. 1839).
52. See, e.g., 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1043 (3d ed. 1939).
53. Id. § 1044; see, Dawson v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S.C. 1839).
54. Little v. Little, 215 S.C. 52, 53 S.E.2d 884 (1949) ; Williams v. Law-
rence, 194 S.C. 1, 8 S.E.2d 838 (1940) ; Burke v. Burke, 141 S.C. 1, 139 S.E.
209 (1927); Morgan v. Morgan, 116 S.C. 272, 108 S.E. 110 (1921); Youmans
v. Youmans, 115 S.C. 186, 105 S.E. 31 (1920); Sparkman v. Jones, 81 S.C.
453, 62 S.E. 870 (1908) ; McDaniel v. Anderson, 19 S.C. 211 (1883) ; Dawson
v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S.C. 1839).
55. Little v. Little, 215 S.C. 52, 53 S.E2d 884 (1949) ; Williams v Lawrence,
194 S.C. 1, 8 S.E2d 838 (1940); Morgan v. Morgan, 116 S.C. 272, 108 S.E.
110 (1921).
56. See Rountree v. Rountree, 85 S.C. 383, 67 S.E. 471 (1910). In this case
the deed was not probated or recorded until after the death of the grantor,
and was not, even then, recorded by anyone to whom it had been delivered
by the grantor. The court held this overcame the presumption of delivery.
Cf. Dawson v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S.C. 1839).
1968] NoTzs
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that there was no delivery57 will overcome this presumption.
As the recording of the instrument by the grantor shows,
prim fadie, an intention that it should become legally operative,
likewise the transfer of the instrument to another,58 or to the
grantee himself,59 to be recorded would also seem to show an
intention to deliver.
In some jurisdictions, the fact that the purpose of the con-
veyance was to prevent the assertion or collection of a claim by
a third party against the grantor and not to vest beneficial
interest in the grantee has been said to preclude the presumption
of delivery. However, this view has been criticized by certain
authorities.00 In Little v. Little, 1 the grantor consulted a tax
accountant who advised her that she might avoid or minimize
inheritance taxes by making gifts to her children. The grantor
executed several deeds and later had them recorded. A dispute
arose over a description in one of the deeds and the grantor
decided against distribution of the property. The deeds and the
land had remained within the grantor's control and possession
She further alleged that the distribution had been for tax pur-
poses and that she did not know of the presumption of delivery
when she recorded the deeds. Thus, she claimed no delivery.
The court held that there was delivery, stating that since the
grantor's object was to avoid inheritance taxes and to take ad-
vantage of the gift tax exemptions, this purpose could not be
accomplished by invalid deeds. "[S]he could not 'eat her cake
and have it too.' On the contrary, the plan implied validity of
57. Sec Burke v. Burke, 141 S.C. 1, 139 S.E. 209 (1927).
58. Withers v. Jenkins, 6 S.C. 122 (1875); Cloud v. Calhoun, 10 Rich. Eq.
358 (S.C. 1858).
59. See McGee v. Wells, 52 S.C. 472, 30 S.E. 602 (1898). In McDaniel v.
Anderson, 19 S.C. 211 (1883), the court declared the recording sufficient with-
out reference to the party that recorded it. This has been justified by the fact
that it is probable that it was placed on record, either by the grantor, thus
showing intent on his part to make it operative, or by the grantee, whose pos-
session of the deed itself raises a presumption of delivery. See also 4 H.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPEarY § 1044 (3d ed. 1939).
60. Tiffany states:
The instrument cannot operate in any degree for his protection unless
it operates as a conveyance, and the fact that he desires protection
would seem to be rather an additional reason for regarding the instru-
ment as having become operative by delivery. Even conceding that his
purpose to avoid payment of claims would show that there was no
delivery, it might be questioned whether he, or one claiming in his right,
should be allowed to assert that the ordinary inference from his use of
the recording system should not be drawn because he made such use for
purposes of deception.
4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1044 (3d ed. 1939).
61. 215 S.C. 52, 53 S.E2d 884 (1949).
[Vol. 20
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all the deeds, and, therefore, legal delivery of all of them, in-
cluding the one in question."
62
That the grantor retains possession of the deed after it is re-
corded is not entitled to much consideration in rebutting the
presumption of delivery.
63
G. Conduct of the Parties
In deciding the question of delivery, the courts often rely
strongly on the conduct of the parties. If the parties act as if
title has not passed, this will be strong evidence of non-delivery,
even though there has been a manual delivery.64 It is often
stated by authorities that while acts of the grantor showing that
title has passed are strong evidence of delivery, acts of the
grantee are of little value in this regard.65 However, when
the grantee acts in such a manner that the only sensible con-
clusion is that title has passed, this will be strong evidence of
delivery.66
IV. CoNcLvsIoN
It can be seen from the present discussion that delivery may
be accomplished in a variety of ways. As stated by the court
in Harris v. Saunders,67 there is no prescribed formula for the
delivery of a deed, but rather delivery must be ascertained
from all the facts and circumstances. Physical acts which are
sufficient in one case may not be in another, but no act of the
grantor will be sufficient to constitute delivery unless there is
an intent to deliver. In the usual case, there has often been
62. Id. at 61, 53 S.E2d at 888.
63. See Little v. Little, 215 S.C. 52, 53 S.E2d 884 (1949); Dawson v.
Dawson, Rice Eq. 243 (S.C. 1839).
64. Fraser v. Davie, 11 S.C. 56 (1878). In this case the court held that even
though the deed was executed by the grantor to a trustee and placed in the
trustee's hands, the subsequent conduct of the parties showed that they
mutually understood that withholding the deed from record was equivalent to
withholding it from operating as a deed. See also Little v. Little, 215 S.C.
52, 53 S.E2d 884 (1949).
65. See, e.g., 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1045 (3d ed. 1939).
66. In Branton v. Martin, 243 S.C. 90, 132 S.E2d 285 (1963), the grantor,
who owned property in Myrtle Beach, executed a deed purporting to convey
part of the property to all but one of her children, her daughter Laura. The
grantor then gave the deed to her son who took it to Laura, and asked her
to keep the deed for him. The court held that the fact that the son turned
the deed over to Laura for safekeeping was strong evidence of delivery to him
by the grantor. The deed was either the grantor's or a fabrication by the son.
If it were the latter, it would be inconceivable that he would entrust it to the
only child not included as a grantee.
67. 2 Strob. Eq. 370 (S.C. 1835).
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a physical delivery of the instrument, thus showing a sufficient
manifestation of intent; however, the conveyance still fails be-
cause the intent to make the conveyance legally operative is
lacking. Any presumptions that may arise merely affect the
duty of producing evidence; they do not take the place of the
essential requirement-intent. Briefly stated again, delivery of
a deed includes, not only an aot by which the grantor evinces
a purpose to part with the control of the instrument, but a con-
curring intent to vest title in the grantee.
0 8
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68. Powers v. Rawls, 119 S.C. 134, 112 S.E. 78 (1922).
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